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Abstract
Transparency, user trust, and human comprehension are popular ethical motiva-
tions for interpretable machine learning. In support of these goals, researchers
evaluate model explanation performance using humans and real world applica-
tions. This alone presents a challenge in many areas of artificial intelligence.
In this position paper, we propose a distinction between descriptive and persua-
sive explanations. We discuss reasoning suggesting that functional interpretability
may be correlated with cognitive function and user preferences. If this is indeed
the case, evaluation and optimization using functional metrics could perpetuate
implicit cognitive bias in explanations that threaten transparency. Finally, we pro-
pose two potential research directions to disambiguate cognitive function and ex-
planation models, retaining control over the tradeoff between accuracy and inter-
pretability.
1 Introduction
Interpretable explanations present a direct conflict between explanations that are best describe the
underlying model and explanations that are tailored to the end user. Both features are important,
however, because transparency is an ethical motivation regarding the former while the latter feature
is a matter of user trust and human comprehension. The interpretable machine learning community
has championed evaluation of functional interpretability using human user studies. Little work has
focused on the inherent problems with bias human evaluation in cases where we hope to balance
accuracy and complexity.
Discussion regarding the tradeoff between accuracy and complexity in models has long preceded the
field of interpretable machine learning. In statistics, we discuss "parsimony" [15, 16]. The problem
is also discussed in the philosophy of science under "scientific realism" and "simplification" [6, 7].
The majority of methods found in the interpretable machine learning community optimize for model
complexity, straying away from more complex measures of interpretability. In fact, Ribeiro et al.
[14] explicitly mentions optimization using model complexity as a proxy for interpretability in his
seminal paper. But evaluation for these explanation systems is conducted using more complex defi-
nitions of interpretability. This difference between how explanation systems are optimized and how
explanation systems are evaluated can introduce bias into the explanation vehicles and strategies
themselves. In this way, control over the tradeoff between accuracy and simplicity is at risk when in
pursuit of better performance on real world evaluation metrics.
Studies have shown that users better understand and trust models that match their expectations and
frame of view. When the user’s model is subpar, there is a boundary at which our current evalua-
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tion metrics will reward similarity to the faulty user model despite the explanation becoming more
complex or less faithful to the underlying model.
In Section 2, we define terminology relevant to interpretable model explanations and human cog-
nitive function that may affect functional interpretability. We provide definitions that distinguish
between explanations that emphasize accuracy and explanations that balance that accuracy with
human-related metrics in Section 3. Motivation and discussion concerning human evaluation and
the resulting biases are discussed in Section 4. We present two potential research directions to
mitigate the negative effects of human evaluation for interpretable machine learning in Section 5.
2 Related Terminology
An interpretable explanation, or explanation, is a simple model, visualization, or text description
that lies in an interpretable feature space and approximates a more complex model. In this work,
we focus on those in the form of statistical models, algorithms, or rules while referring to them
as explanation models. Model complexity is a measure of the amount of information contained in
a model. In this paper, we will often refer to the model complexity of an explanatory model as
explanation complexity.
We introduce new terms to further clarify different components of interpretable explanation model
systems. An explanation vehicle is the model class of an explanation such as decision trees, general-
ized additive models [3], falling rule lists [17]. We expand this definition to pairings of model class
and a fixed explanation complexity constraint, e.g. decision trees of depth less than 10. We define
an explanation strategy as the combination of explanation vehicle, objective function, constraints
and hyperparameters required to generate an interpretable model explanation. Finally, we consider
a particular implementation of an explanation strategy that has been fit to an underlying machine
learning model to be an explanation model system, or explanation system in short. >
3 Characterization of explanation strategies
3.1 Descriptive explanation strategies
High-fidelity explanations, also referred to as faithful, have a strong correspondence between the
explanation model and the underlying machine learning model [14]. We define a descriptive ex-
planation strategy as one that generates explanations with maximum model fidelity for a particular
explanation vehicle and underlying machine learning model. Optimizing a descriptive explanation
often involves a traditional accuracy metric, such as mean squared error calculated between the
underlying and explanatory models.
Descriptive explanations best satisfy the ethical goal of transparency. When our explanations are
more faithful to the underlying machine learning model, humans have more information about the
inner workings of the system. This value is of societal importance and studied by the science and
technology studies community, as well as the public policy and law community.
Persuasive explanation strategies
In contrast to descriptive explanations, persuasive explanation strategiesdo not achieve maximum
model fidelity and often incorporate user preferences, knowledge, or characteristics. Much like a
persuasive argument, these explanations balance accuracy with being convincing to the user. They
are less faithful to the underlying model than descriptive explanations in a tradeoff for more freedom
on the explanation complexity, structure, and parameters. This freedom permits explanations better
tailored to human cognitive function, making them more functionally interpretable.
Model complexity is one of the most practiced persuasive treatments. This is natural because the
optimal model complexity of an explanation may be dependent on user expectations and expertise.
Researchers often must limit explanation complexity to facilitate trust and understanding by humans.
Some aim to make an explanation simple enough to be contemplated by a human at once, a trait that
Lipton [12] calls simulatability.
User trust and understanding are two popular ethical motivations for interpretability. We consider
these goals persuasive, as the both rely on human cognitive function and preferences. Framing our
2
ethical goals with respect to persuasive explanation strategies highlights some ethical dilemmas that
have plagued model interpretability research as it’s currently practiced:
When is it unethical to manipulate an explanation to better persuade users?
How do we balance our concerns for transparency and ethics with our desire for interpretability?
Implicit human cognitive bias
Doshi-Velez and Kim [4] review evaluation within interpretable machine learning, describing both
human evaluation in practical applications and functional evaluation using quantitative metrics. Af-
ter proposing a taxonomy of evaluation methods, they hypothesize that we may find common la-
tent factors to inform our understanding of both explanation vehicles and the applications to which
they were applied. We believe this is an important analysis to pursue. However, finding latent
factors amongst heavily influenced decisions for explanation vehicles, application domains, and per-
formance metrics will lead to biased output unless representation across each choice is balanced.
If human cognitive attributes and user expectations are indeed predictive of user trust or comprehen-
sion, it will be a major source of this bias. The expectations and expertise to which explanations are
compared can differ greatly across users and applications. There may also be characteristics shared
across all human users that affect the performance of an explanation system. We refer to this as
implicit human cognitive bias.
Explanation systems are more likely to overfit to these attributes as researchers produce new systems.
This effect is amplified due to publication bias. As the field matures, only explanation vehicles and
strategies that achieve top results in performance will be published and visible to the community.
Researchers will then favor and mimic top performing explanation strategies as the basis for their
future work. If methods that incorporate human cognitive function and preferences score more
highly on functional evaluation metrics and future work is based off of that research, we may not
capture the characteristics that led to higher functional performance. Even if we understand the
cognitive attributes of an explanation strategy, methods like that in Doshi-Velez and Kim [4] fail to
allow for fine-tuned control over accuracy and interpretability.
Other fields within artificial intelligence base performance on human evaluation and are also likely
to have human cognitive bias. Examples include machine translation, information retrieval, and
the user modeling, adaptation, and personalization (UMAP) communities. The perils of human
evaluation warrant further study in these areas. However, these communities may favor results that
best match human performance outright, as success is defined by the ability to replicate human
performance. This definition of success would make research in these fields more tolerant of human
cognitive bias than the machine learning interpretability community.
Implicit human cognitive bias is problematic within interpretable machine learning, as it directly
limits our ability to provide purely descriptive explanations that are accurate and transparent. When
the bias becomes sufficiently large, we will fail to satisfy our ethical goals related to transparency of
the underlying machine learning model.
4 Research directions to combat implicit human cognitive bias
We present two research directions that have potential to reduce the implicit cognitive bias in in-
terpretable explanation strategies, while still prioritizing functional human interpretability and trust.
Both methods allow for control over the tradeoff between transparency and interpretability.
4.1 Separation between descriptive and persuasive tasks
One direction involves separating the descriptive and persuasive explanation generation tasks. In this
case, we treat explanation complexity as a persuasive strategy attribute. In the first step, we create
a fully descriptive explanation within an interpretable feature space for a particular explanation
vehicle. No efforts to simplify the explanation are made beyond projection into a given interpretable
feature space. The explanation is altered to becomemore persuasive in the second and final step. It is
here we incorporate human cognitive function, user preferences, and expertise into the explanation.
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This process is already treated as two separate steps in a number of interpretable explanation sys-
tems with regard to model complexity. When reducing model complexity, some researchers choose
to fit a fully descriptive model before truncating it to reduce complexity. For example, using a stan-
dard CART algorithm [? ], we may produce a decision tree in an interpretable feature space that
is of depth 40. This model is assumed to be too complex for human understanding, so we may
remove nodes at depth greater than 10 to elicit an altered explanation that is more persuasive and
interpretable.
This separation of concern encourages more rapid innovation and reduces the cost of evaluation.
When separated, the descriptive step can be evaluated using functional metrics. Researchers devel-
oping methods to project uninterpretable models into an interpretable feature space could rid them-
selves of the expensive and delicate human evaluation tasks. The persuasive step is now transformed
to a task of altering a model of a specific explanation vehicle to balance accuracy and interpretabil-
ity. Researchers can make progress on the evaluation of explanations across different users and
applications without conflating it with the choice of explanation vehicle.
4.2 Explicit inclusion of cognitive features
The second research direction we consider is extending the objective function to include cognitive
attributes and expertise that influence our functional measures of interpretability.
This strategy has some clear disadvantages:
• Incomplete coverage – Any cognitive features that are important to model user trust or
any measures of functional interpretability should be explicitly included as a constraint.
A feature that is missing from our explanation strategy’s loss function will contribute to
the implicit cognitive bias. Relevant cognitive features may differ across applications and
evaluation metrics.
• Knowledge representation – User expertise is expected to be an important factor in the
functional interpretability of an explanation. However, collecting the knowledge graph of
an individual or a group is expensive as well as incomplete [9, 11].
• Multi-objective loss functions – Optimization of a multi-objective loss function becomes
difficult when nontrivial [10, 13, 5, 1]. Goh et al. [8] proposes a solution for this problem
using dataset constraints and a ramp penalty. The increased complexity in optimization
may pose difficulty in fitting reasonable explanations.
We present user conviction as an example of an explicit attribute of human cognition. This, like
other cognitive attributes, is a function of the users’ personal expertise model. It represents a fairly
difficult attribute, as it differs between individual users and requires the capture of user knowledge.
(See Knowledge representation above.)
Brey [2] describes the conflict between a user trusting one’s own judgments and intuitions with
trusting that of a potentially more intelligent technology. While his comment is with regard to
intelligence-enabled devices, the conflict is comparable to that of users evaluating trust in machine
learning explanations. In this paper, we define user conviction as the propensity of an individual or
group to trust their own judgment of classification model above that of the interpretable explanation.
At this point in time, we treat user conviction Cuser as a single parameter across the entire user
expectation model 0 ≤ Cuser ≤ 1, Cuser ∈ R. The concept of user conviction can be extended to
capture feature-level or decision-level trust for more fine-grained evaluation.
If known, we then incorporate the user’s knowledgemodel with conviction such that for a given input
xi, yexpl(xi) is the predicted from the explanation, and yuser(xi) is the reported user expectation:
Cuser
∑
i
(yuser(xi)− yˆexpl(xi))
2.
5 Conclusion
We presented two research directions that may mitigate the negative consequences of implicit human
cognitive bias. We believe that this research should be further studied to better characterize the risks
that are presented by human evaluation of functional interpretability.
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